Dorrance v. U.S., 2015 WL 8241954 (9th Cir. 2015)
This case is the latest in the cases involving tax impact of the sale of stock received by a policy holder from a mutual life insurance company on demutualization, and a case of first impression at the Federal circuit court level. Here, the Dorrances purchased life insurance policies from several mutual life insurance companies in 1996 to replace the then estimate of their anticipated estate tax liability. In 2003, the Dorrances received stock in the resulting stock company when each of these mutual life insurance companies demutualized in a tax free transaction into a stock company. The Dorrances then sold this stock also in 2003, and reported the sales on their 2003 income tax return as capital gain transactions, reporting a zero cost basis. The Dorrances later filed a claim for refund, now asserting that the stock received in the demutualization had a cost basis calculated in large part on the premiums paid for the life insurance policies prior to demutualization. When the Service did not respond to the refund claim, the Dorrances filed suit seeking a refund.
In the refund suit, the Dorrances, as the taxpayers, had the burden of proving their cost basis in the stock sold in 2003. They argued that the cost basis was equal to the value of the stock at the time it was received, the time of the demutualization. The government took the position that the stock had zero basis. The district court in Arizona ruled that the stock had some calculable basis, less than the value at the time of demutualization, but greater than zero. Both the Dorrances and the government appealed and the 9th Circuit ruled that the Dorrances had the burden of proving their cost basis and they failed to establish that they had any basis in the membership rights for which they had received the stock distributed in the demutualization.
With a mutual life insurance company, the policyholders own the company. The premiums paid for the life insurance policies, to the extent these premiums exceed the policy expenses, are returned to the policyholders in the form of dividends. Dividends received in cash, used to buy policy riders, to pay premiums or to pay principal or interest on policy loans reduce the policy owner’s investment in the contract, and dividends used to purchase paid-up additional insurance neither increase nor reduce the investment in the contract, since they remain in the policy. Dividends are generally not taxable, unless and until the cumulative dividends, combined with all other non-taxable distributions from the policy, exceed “the aggregate of premiums or other consideration paid or deemed to have been paid by the recipient.” See Reg. Sec. 1.72-11(b)(1). Once the dividends exceed the policyholder’s investment in the life insurance contract, the dividends paid out in cash, or cash withdrawn from the policy as a result of a policy cash-in or partial or complete policy lapse, are taxed as ordinary income. The premiums are treated as payments for the life insurance contract and are not allocated in any part to the membership rights of the policyholders of a mutual life insurance company. There are no excess premiums that would be available to provide basis build up for membership rights of the policyholder of a policy purchased from a mutual life insurance company.
So held the 9th Circuit, that the premiums paid by the Dorrances were for the life insurance policy contract and that none of the premiums were paid for the membership rights. Since the Dorrances had zero basis in the membership rights that were demutualized, when they received stock in a tax free reorganization in which their membership rights were replaced with the stock of the stock life insurance company, they had zero basis in the stock received. As the court expert put it, the stock in the subsequent stock life insurance company was received by the Dorrances as a “windfall”. In fact, in the materials received by the Dorrances from the mutual life insurance companies with regard to the receipt of stock, each of the companies indicated that “the cost basis of these shares for tax purposes will be zero.” The Court agreed.
The government had attempted to suspend action in a similar case involving the same issue that arose in California pending the outcome of the Dorrance case. However, after the government lost its zero basis argument in Fisher v. U.S.,82 Fed. Cl. 780(2008), Timothy Reuben decided to file his Federal refund claim to recover the taxes paid on his sale of the Manulife shares distributed to him from the Don H. and Jeannette H. Reuben Children’s Irrevocable Trust that the Reuben Trust had received on the demutualization of Manulife. Reuben had reported the sale initially showing a zero basis, and later filed his claim for refund claiming that he had a calculated cost basis in these shares on the same basis as the Fisher court had determined.
The Fisher court determined that the “Open Transaction Doctrine” applied. Under that doctrine, where there are several parts to property for which it is “impossible or impractical” to apportion the cost basis among, the taxpayer does not recognize any capital gain on disposition of a part of the property until the entire cost basis of the property has been recovered. The Fisher court determined that the premium paid by Fisher were for the acquisition of both the insurance policy and the ownership rights in Manulife, a mutual life insurance company. When the company demutualized, Fisher elected to receive cash in lieu of stock, which cash reduced his investment in the contract, his basis in the life insurance policy, under the Open Transaction Doctrine. On this ground, the Fisher court ruled that Fisher was entitled to his refund.
In Reuben v. U.S., 2013 WL _____________, the U.S. District Court in the Central District of California issued its opinion on January 15, 2013, denying Reuben’s motion for summary judgment based on the argument that the Open Transaction Doctrine applied in Fisher should be applied here. First noting that the Fisher opinion had been criticized, the Reuben court then noted that Fisher had elected to receive cash, and Reuben had elected to receive share of the stock company, on the demutualization of Manulife, a distinction the court found compelling in its refusal to follow the Fisher decision. The Reuben court then granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, stating that Reuben had the burden of proving his basis in the stock sold, and that Reuben provided no evidence in support of his position that some portion of the premiums were paid for membership interests. The court found that government “adverted to substantial evidence” that no portion of the premiums were paid for the membership interests in Manulife, that is (i) at the time of demutualization, Manulife informed its policyholders that the tax basis in the shares received would be zero, (ii) the actuary hired by Manulife at the time of the demutualization viewed the stock as a windfall to the policyholders, (iii) the actuary hired by the government agreed that the stock had no basis and that the process of demutualization is what gave the shares value, and (iv) the premiums paid for the Manulife policies after the demutualization was the same as before the demutualization, for the life insurance policy and not for the membership rights.
It would seem that Reuben’s rush to court was simply a rush to incur more legal fees that could have been avoided if he had just agreed to suspend the case until the 9th Circuit had issued its opinion in Dorrance.
When the taxpayer in PLR 201547010 decided to invest his IRA assets in a partnership, he forgot to check whether his IRA provider was able to hold an interest in a partnership as an investment in the IRAs for which it served as custodian. While all IRA accounts are able to hold investments in publicly traded securities, i.e. stocks, bonds and mutual funds, not all IRA custodians are set up to handle alternative investments, such as direct ownership of a business, real estate, partnership interests and LLC member interests, in their IRA accounts managed pursuant to their IRA account agreements. In fact, some IRA account agreements specifically preclude ownership of such alternative assets in the IRA accounts covered by the IRA custodian’s account agreement.
In this PLR, Taxpayer A instructed the IRA Custodian to invest his IRA assets in a percentage partnership interest of Partnership C. The IRA Custodian issued a check in November of 2012 payable to Partnership C for the amount required for purchase of that percentage partnership interest in Partnership C, and Partnership C indicated that the percentage interest was owned by “Taxpayer A IRA”. However, since the IRA Custodian’s account agreement did not authorize the Custodian to hold the partnership interest in Taxpayer A’s IRA, the IRA Custodian issued a 1099-R reporting the payment to Partnership C as a distribution from Taxpayer A’s IRA. When finalizing the preparation of his 2012 income tax return in October 2013, Taxpayer A finally came to a full appreciation of the significance of the IRA Custodian’s 1099-R, that a mistake had been made in the purchase of the percentage partnership interest. Had he opened another IRA with another IRA Custodian whose account agreement would permit the ownership of a percentage interest in Partnership C in a new IRA account for Taxpayer A and had he directed the old IRA Custodian to transfer the amount for purchase of the Partnership C percentage partnership interest in a custodian to custodian transfer from Taxpayer A’s IRA B for a new IRA to use to purchase the Partnership C percentage partnership interest directly in a Taxpayer A IRA, there would have been no 2012 IRA distribution to report on his 2012 income tax return.
Since more than 60 days had elapsed following the purchase of the Partnership C percentage partnership interest with assets from Taxpayer A’s IRA B, the amount of the purchase price for this interest could no longer be rolled over to a new IRA without a waiver by the Service of the 60 day rollover requirement under § 408(d)(3). The Service has the authority to waive the requirement that the rollover of funds to an IRA be completed within 60 days from the date on which the distributee received the property distributed “where the failure to waive such requirement would be against equity or good conscience, including casualty, disaster, or other events beyond the reasonable control of the individual subject to such requirement.” § 402(c)(3)(B).
As set forth in Rev. Proc. 2003-16, 2003-4 I.R.B. 359 (January 8, 2003), in determining whether to waive the 60 day requirement, the Service will “consider all relevant fact and circumstances,” including:
Taxpayer A attempted to convince the Service that his failure to purchase the Partnership C partnership interest in his IRA was due to financial institution error, to fall within one of the factors enumerated in Rev. Proc. 2003-16. Instead, the Service stated that “Taxpayer A chose to use the proceeds from IRA B to fund a business venture rather than attempt to roll the proceeds over into an IRA account for retirement purposes.” Apparently, the Service was focusing on the failure of Taxpayer A to open a new IRA with an IRA Custodian who was able to hold a partnership interest in Taxpayer A’s IRA, as a failure or error within the control of Taxpayer A. All Taxpayer A had to do was read the IRA account agreement, or contact Custodian C directly about whether Custodian C was able to hold Partnership B partnership interests in Taxpayer A’s IRA. Had he done that, he would have known that he needed a different IRA in order to do what he wanted to do, that is, own Partnership C partnership interests in his IRA. This failure was, in the Service’s view, within the “reasonable control” of Taxpayer A, and was beyond the scope of the Service’s ability to waive the 60 day rollover requirement.
The 7520 rate for July 2016 has remained at 1.8%.
The July 2016 Applicable Federal Interest Rates can be found here.
Originally posted on the Bryan Cave Bankruptcy & Restructuring Blog, found here.
A recent decision out of a New Jersey Bankruptcy Court highlights a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code which may allow Chapter 7 debtors to keep significant assets out of the hands of trustees and creditors.
In In re Norris, the Bankruptcy Court considered whether an inherited individual retirement account is property of the bankruptcy estate. Prior to the Debtor filing her bankruptcy case, her stepmother passed away, leaving an inherited IRA naming the Debtor as the beneficiary. In her amended schedules, the Debtor listed the inherited IRA, claiming it as fully exempt under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12), but also claiming the inherited IRA was not property of the estate. The Chapter 7 Trustee objected to the exemption and requested the inherited IRA be deemed property of the bankruptcy estate. (more…)
The 7520 rate for June 2016 has remained at 1.8%.
The June 2016 Applicable Federal Interest Rates can be found here.
Update: According to media sources, a lawyer for Bremer Bank and Trust, the corporate fiduciary appointed to administerPrince’s estate, said the bank is continuing to search for a will and the judge in the Court, Judge Kevin W. Eidge, stated “We are not finding that there’s no will, but that no will has yet been found.”
The following was originally published on April 28, 2016.
As we’ve all seen in the news, musician Prince passed away on April 21, 2016 at the age of 57. According to news sources, on April 26, just five days later, one of Prince’s six siblings, his sister Tyka Nelson, filed documents with the Carver County probate court stating “I do not know of the existence of a Will and have no reason to believe that the Decedent executed testamentary documents in any form.” News sources have gone crazy, announcing that Prince died without a Will directing who should inherit his estate and therefore his six siblings will inherit everything. But is this actually true? Maybe, maybe not.
We don’t know about you, but, except for the fact that this is what we do for a living, our brothers (we each only have one sibling) would probably have no idea if we have a Will (or other estate planning) in place. Maybe he would get around to going through all of our files to see if we have one stored somewhere or find the name of our lawyer in six days, but that’s pretty unlikely, given all of the things that typically take place immediately after someone dies (think, funeral, grieving, etc.). Tyka may be absolutely correct – We’re not saying she’s not, but we don’t think that her statement that she doesn’t know of a Will conclusively means there isn’t one. As of yesterday, TIME Magazine online reported that Bremer Trust Company was appointed by a judge to temporarily oversee Prince’s estate for six, which indicates that the court is not closing on the door on a possible Will being produced. (more…)
You may not have produced over 30 albums, accrued over $300 million and an equivalent amount of fans as Prince, but, like the recent pop star, you too have a legacy that could impact many individuals around you. (more…)
The 7520 rate for May 2016 has remained at 1.8%.
The May 2016 Applicable Federal Interest Rates can be found here.
Bryan Cave St. Louis partner, Douglas Stanley, and associate, Jarriot Rook, authored an article in the recently-published spring issue of the St. Louis Bar Journal, concerning the key issues to consider in nonjudicial settlement of fiduciary disputes.